The Routley-Meyer relational semantics for relevant logics is extended to give a sound and complete model theory for many propositionally quantified relevant logics (and some non-relevant ones). This involves a restriction on which sets of worlds are admissible as propositions, and an interpretation of propositional quantification that makes ∀pA true when there is some true admissible proposition that entails all p-instantiations of A.
Introduction
Propositional quantification played a role in the early development of ideas about relevant implication. Anderson and Belnap observed in [2] that enriching their entailment system E by quantifiers ∀p, ∃p binding propositional variables allowed the definition of other conditionals. Thus an enthymematic conditional A ⊃ B, i.e. one with a suppressed true assumption, could be defined as ∃p(p ∧ (A ∧ p → B)),
where → is the implication of system E. Strict implication A B could be defined as
where N is the necessity modality defined by taking N p to be (p → p) → p. They stated that adding the quantifiers to the positive fragment of E gives a system whose theorems in , ∧ and ∨ coincide exactly with the positive fragment of Lewis's system S4 of strict implication, and whose theorems in ⊃, ∧ and ∨ coincide exactly with the positive fragment of Heyting's system of intuitionistic logic. Also, if the negation ¬A is defined as A ⊃ (∀p)p, then the theorems in ⊃, ¬, ∧ and ∨ coincide exactly with the full intuitionistic propositional calculus. Here (∀p)p serves as the Falsum, an absurdity implying every proposition.
No axioms for the quantifiers were stated in [2] , but these were supplied by Anderson in [1] , extending E and the system R of relevant implication to logics E † and R † whose quantifier axioms were the universal closures of the schemes (∀p(p → p) → A) → A.
Meyer in [9] gave alternative axiomatisations of these logics, calling them EP and RP. He studied the above conditional definitions and others, verifying the assertions about connections with intuitionistic logic and S4. He also noted that the Ackermann constant t, thought of as the conjunction of all truths, could be quantificationally defined as ∀p(p → p).
The volume [3] devoted its first chapter to relevant systems extended by propositional quantification, using the notation (which we adopt) S ∀p for some system S thus extended. A semantics for propositional quantifiers was discussed by Routley and Meyer when they introduced their possible-worlds style model theory for the logic R in [10] . Their model structures carry a quasi-order ≤, and propositions are interpreted to be subsets of the structure that are hereditary, i.e. closed upward under the quasi-order, as in Kripke's intuitionistic semantics. They observed that taking ∀ to mean "for all hereditary subsets" gives a sound semantics -all theorems of RP are validated -but stated their belief that completeness fails. This was by analogy with Henkin's primary interpretations of higher-order logic [6] , given that this interpretation of ∀ was second-order in nature. Kremer [7] eventually proved their conjecture by showing that the set of formulas validated by the Routley-Meyer primary semantics for RP is not recursively axiomatisable.
The present paper provides a complete relational semantics for RP, EP and other propositionally quantified relevant logics. The initial idea is to restrict the class of hereditary sets that are admissible as propositions. Each model structure will have a fixed collection P rop of hereditary sets over which the propositional variables range. We require P rop to be closed under the operations interpreting the logical connectives. This approach has been successfully used to model non-quantified (Boolean) propositional modal logics that are incomplete for their Kripke semantics, and has also been applied to some substructural logics 1 . But here we have the new question of how to interpret the propositional quantifiers relative to P rop.
Our answer, in brief, is an old one from algebraic logic: a universal quantifier is interpreted by a greatest lower bound in the lattice of propositions, this being the natural interpretation of arbitrary conjunctions. An approach of this kind was developed for quantification of individual variables in [8] . Here it is adapted to quantification of propositional variables. To explain how this works, let ∀pA be a sentence, and A(P ) be the result of replacing free p in A by the hereditary set (proposition) P , viewed as a constant. Let |∀pA| and |A(P )| be the hereditary sets of worlds at which these sentences are true, respectively. The RoutleyMeyer primary semantics in effect takes ∀pA to have the same meaning as the conjunction of the A(P )'s as P ranges over all hereditary sets, so puts |∀pA| = {|A(P )| : P is hereditary}.
This makes |∀pA| the greatest lower bound of the |A(P )|'s in the set of all hereditary sets under the partial order ⊆ of set inclusion. That partial order is also the interpretation of the entailment relation between propositions.
In a model whose set P rop of admissible propositions contains only some of the hereditary sets, we take |∀xA| = P ∈P rop
where denotes greatest lower bound in the ordered set (P rop, ⊆). Our definition of "model" will require that P ∈P rop |A(P )| always exists in P rop. But it may not be equal to the intersection {|A(P )| : P ∈ P rop}. Instead it will be the largest admissible proposition included in this intersection, and hence the union of all admissible propositions included in the intersection. Writing a |= ∀pA for "∀pA is true at world a", i.e. a ∈ |∀xA|, we get that a |= ∀pA iff there is some X ∈ P rop such that a ∈ X and X ⊆ P ∈P rop |A(P )|.
Thus
∀pA is true at a iff some admissible proposition true at a entails every admissible instantiation A(P ) of A.
Our "old" use of greatest lower bounds as conjunctions provides a new semantic propositional analysis of the meaning of ∀p.
To develop a semantics that can interpret all formulas and not just sentences, we need to assign propositions to variables. A formula A with n free variables p 1 , . . . , p n can be seen as defining an n-ary propositional function, i.e. a function of the form P rop n → P rop, taking each n-tuple P 1 , . . . , P n of admissible propositions to the proposition |A(P 1 , . . . , P n )| expressed by A when each p i is assigned the value P i . Since different formulas may have different numbers of free variables, this approach would involve handling finitary propositional functions of different arities, which would quickly become cumbersome. A more convenient and equally natural approach is to use functions of the form P rop ω → P rop, where ω = {0, 1, 2, . . . }. An element f ∈ P rop ω is a function f : ω → P rop that serves as a valuation assigning the proposition f (n) to the variable p n for all n ∈ ω, and so is a device that gives a value to all variables simultaneously. Such an f can be thought as a sequence f (0), . . . , f (n), . . . of admissible propositions. Each formula A determines a propositional function |A| : P rop ω → P rop, taking each f ∈ P rop ω to the admissible proposition |A|f expressed by A when its free variables are interpreted according to f . |A| is defined formally by induction on the length of A, as will be seen in Section 3. Now just as we do not admit arbitrary hereditary sets as propositions, so too we do not expect an arbitrary function from P rop ω to P rop to be the interpretation of a logical formula. In addition to P rop, our model structures have a fixed collection P ropF un of admissible propositional functions that is closed under function-building operations interpreting the connectives and quantifiers. These closure properties ensure that |A| ∈ P ropF un for any formula A, and hence that |A|f is always admissible.
As well as proving soundness and completeness of many logics under our semantics, we also give incompleteness results showing that our admissible-propositions approach is essential. These results demonstrate that many of our logics are incomplete for validity in models in which every hereditary set is admissible. This is done by exhibiting a particular sentence that is valid in all such models but not a theorem of the logic in question. The latter part of the proof requires the development of an algebraic semantics using Boolean algebras that are order-complete but atomless.
The next section defines the many logics we study and gives their pertinent prooftheoretic properties. Section 3 defines our model structures and models, and gives the soundness theorem for the weakest logic. Section 4 proves the completeness theorem for this logic by a canonical model construction, and then Section 5 extends these results to all the other logics. The final Section 6 gives the incompleteness results via algebraic semantics.
Logics
Our formal language is based on a countably infinite set V ar = {p 0 , p 1 , p 2 , . . .} of propositional variables, and a countably infinite set Con of propositional constants (we will usually use the letter c, possibly with subscripts, to refer to members of Con). Formulas are generated from these variables and constants in the standard way, using the connectives →, ∧, ¬; a special propositional constant t; and the universal quantifiers ∀p n . We also employ the abbreviations Axiom Schemes:
Rules:
By a logic we mean any set L of formulas that includes all instances of these axioms and is closed under these rules. We call formula A an L-theorem, and write L A, when A ∈ L. The smallest logic will be called B t∀p . The labels A1-A9 and R1-R5 are as used in chapters 4 and 5 of [11] , what we call R6 here is called CR1 there and what we call R7 here is called CR7 there. It will be noted that R6 and R7 are the rules tE and tI stated by Anderson and Belnap when extending their systems with t (for an overview see [3, §R2] ). The label RIC stands for "Rule of Intentional Confinement".
From R7, RIC and R6, it is evident that any logic is closed under the rule
• A → ∀p n A with p n not free in A are derivable in any logic.
Lemma 2.1. For any formula A with at most one free variable p n , and for any closed formulas B and
Proof. This is by induction on the complexity of A. We give only the inductive cases for the quantifiers.
If
as B is closed, and similarly for C. Then we have
To consider some of the relevant (and irrelevant) logics that have been discussed in the literature, we list some optional axioms below.
B1.
(
The axioms B1-B20, C1-C5 and D1-D8 are taken directly from Chapter 4 of [11] , though with some labeling differences in the case of the t axioms C1-C5. R t∀p is the smallest logic containing B3-B6, D4, E1 and E2. E3 is derivable in R t∀p . RP is R t∀p without R6 and R7, in the language without the constant t.
Any logic containing E1 also contains
whenever p n is not free in A. Now if Σ is any subset of this collection of optional axiom schemas, let L Σ be the smallest logic that includes all instances of the members of Σ. A logic of the form L Σ will be called inductively generated. Theoremhood in an inductively generated logic is determined by finite proof sequences: LΣ A iff there is a finite sequence A 0 , . . . , A n = A such that each A i is either an instance of A1-A10 or of a member of Σ, or is derivable from earlier members of the sequence by one of the rules R1-R7, RIC. Using this fact, we can show
Lemma 2.2. Every inductively defined logic is closed under the rules

RIC(con):
A → B[c/p n ] A → ∀p n B if c is not in A or B, and p n is not free in A.
UG(con):
. . , c mn are distinct and not in A.
Proof. The derivations of RIC(con) and UG(con) are similar to Lemmas 6.6 and Corollary 6.7 of [8] , using the finite proof-sequence characterisation of theoremhood in the logic. 
Semantics
Our models use structures of the form K, 0, R, * , where K is some set (of worlds or setups, or situations . . . ), 0 is a subset of K (the regular, or base worlds), R is a ternary relation on K and * is a unary function on K. We write a ≤ b to mean that there is some x ∈ 0 such that Rxab. A set P ⊆ K is hereditary if it is closed upward under this relation, i.e. if a ∈ P and a ≤ b then b ∈ P . We call this a basic model structure if it satisfies:
(P1) 0 is hereditary.
(P2) ≤ is reflexive and transitive.
(P3) Rbcd and a ≤ b implies Racd.
Operations ⇒ and − on the powerset ℘K of K are defined by
Then P ⇒ Q is hereditary by (P3), and −P is hereditary if P is, by (P5). Now fix a set P rop ⊆ ℘K. For any S ⊆ ℘K, let
This operation will be used to interpret the universal quantifiers ∀p n . In general S ⊆ S, and if S ∈ P rop, then S = S. But it is also possible to have S ∈ P rop while S / ∈ P rop. If S ⊆ P rop and S ∈ P rop, then S is the greatest lower bound of S in the partially ordered set (P rop, ⊆).
By a propositional function, relative to P rop, we will mean a function from P rop ω to P rop. From such functions ϕ, ψ : P rop ω → P rop we specify new functions ϕ ∩ ψ, ϕ ∪ ψ, ϕ ⇒ ψ, −ϕ and ∀ n ϕ on P rop ω . For the definition of ∀ n ϕ we need functions that "update" a variable assignment f , so we write f [P/n] for the function that is identical to f except that it assigns the value P to n. Now we put
A B t∀p -model structure, or just model structure, can now be defined as a structure K = K, 0, R, * , P rop, P ropF un such that K, 0, R, * is a basic model stucture, P rop is a set of hereditary subsets of K, and P ropF un is a set of functions from P rop ω to P rop, satisfying the following conditions:
CProp: 0 ∈ P rop and if X and Y are in P rop, then X ∩ Y ∈ P rop, X ⇒ Y ∈ P rop and −X ∈ P rop.
CTee:
The function ϕ t is in P ropF un, where ϕ t (f ) = 0 for all f ∈ P rop ω .
CEval:
The evaluation function ϕ n is in P ropF un for each n ∈ ω, where ϕ n (f ) = f (n) for all f ∈ P rop ω .
CImp: If ϕ, ψ ∈ P ropF un, then ϕ ⇒ ψ ∈ P ropF un.
CConj:
If ϕ, ψ ∈ P ropF un, then ϕ ∩ ψ ∈ P ropF un.
CNeg: If ϕ ∈ P ropF un, then −ϕ ∈ P ropF un.
CAll: If ϕ ∈ P ropF un, then ∀ n ϕ ∈ P ropF un for all n ∈ ω.
The condition CProp, which clarifies some of the structure of P rop, is derivable from the others: Lemma 3.1. If P ropF un satisfies the conditions CTee, CEval, CImp, CConj and CNeg, then P rop satisfies CProp.
Proof. By CTee it must be that 0 ∈ P rop. Now take any P, Q ∈ P rop and consider some f ∈ P rop ω such that f (1) = P and f (2) = Q. By CEval ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ∈ P ropF un and so by CConj, ϕ 1 ∩ϕ 2 ∈ P ropF un. Now (ϕ 1 ∩ϕ 2 )f = ϕ 1 f ∩ϕ 2 f = f (1)∩f (2) = P ∩Q, hence P ∩Q ∈ P rop. Similar arguments using CImp or CNeg show that P ⇒ Q ∈ P rop and −P ∈ P rop.
A B
t∀p -model, or just model, is a structure
where K is a B t∀p -model sructure, and V : Con → P rop is a function (providing a valuation of the propositional constants) such that:
Each model has a truth/satisfaction relation M, a, f |= A between worlds a ∈ K, variable assignments f ∈ P rop ω , and formulas A. This is defined for each a and f by induction on the complexity of A, and uses the notion of the truth set of A under f as the set |A| M f of worlds at which A is true, i.e.
The inductive definition of |= is as follows.
• M, a, f |= c iff a ∈ V (c)
• M, a, f |= ∀p n A iff there is some X ∈ P rop such that a ∈ X and X ⊆ For A = ∀p m C with p n free in A,
with each step justified as follows:
(a) as p n is assumed free for B in A = ∀p m C. 
This holds because the assumption that p n is free for B in A, implies that B has no free variables that would become bound in
(e) as m = n (else p n would not occur free in A). Proof. Let M be any model on a B t∀p -model structure. We need to show that the axioms A1-A10 are valid in M, and that the rules R1-R7, RIC preserve this validity. For A1-A9 and R1-R7, this proceeds as in [11, §4.5] .
For A10, suppose M, a, f |= ∀p n A. Let B be a formula such that no free variable in B becomes bound in A[B/p n ] (i.e. p n is free for B in A) and define f = f [|B| M f /n]. Now by the truth condition for ∀p n there is some X ∈ P rop such that X ⊆ P ∈P rop |A| M f [P/n] and a ∈ X. In particular, if we take P as |B| M f , then we see
For RIC, Suppose A → B is valid in M, where p n does not occur free in A. By the definition of validity and Semantic Entailment we have that |A| M g ⊆ |B| M g for any g ∈ P rop ω , so
Now as p n is not free in A, Lemma 3.5 ensures that
Hence as |A| M f ∈ P rop by Lemma 3.2,
Completeness of B t∀p
Fix an arbitrary logic L. We construct a characteristic model M L that validates precisely the theorems of L. This adapts the Henkin-style constructions of [10] and [11, §4.6] , in which the points of the model are certain theories, i.e. sets of formulas with suitable proof-theoretic closure conditions. We take much of the propositional-logic aspect of the construction as known from these references, and focus on its extension to our interpretation of the quantifiers. For sets of formulae Γ, ∆, we write Γ L ∆ if there are some A 1 , . . . , A n ∈ Γ and
Γ is an L-theory if for any formula B, Γ L {B} implies B ∈ Γ. An L-theory Γ is prime when A ∨ B ∈ Γ implies A ∈ Γ or B ∈ Γ, and regular when L A implies A ∈ Γ. The appropriate version of Lindenbaum's Lemma in this context is 
From this definition we get an analogue of the Semantic Entailment Lemma 3.4:
Lemma 4.3. For any closed formulas
is an L-independent pair. So by Lemma 4.1 there is some prime L-theory Γ exdending {A} such that (Γ, {B}) is an Lindependent pair. Therefore Γ ∈ K L (as Γ is a prime L-theory), A ∈ Γ and B / ∈ Γ. But then
Conversely, suppose L A → B and consider any a ∈ A L . Then A ∈ a, and as a is an
We need a particular way of naming members of P rop L , since for a given closed B there will be infinitely many closed B with B L = B L . So we assume there is some fixed enumeration of all the closed formulas of our language, and for each Q ∈ P rop L , define B Q to be the first formula in this enumeration such that B Q L = Q. Then for any formula A and Q 0 , Q 1 , . . . ∈ P rop L , let
This definition may be restricted to single substitutions A[Q/p n ] or to any finite substitution A[Q 0 /p n0 , . . . , Q m /p nm ] in the obvious way. We will also allow ourselves the liberty of specifying mixed proposition and formula substitutions, e.g. where Q ∈ P rop and C is a formula,
To show that our choice of an enumeration of closed formulas does not really matter, we have Lemma 4.4. For any formula A with at most one free variable p n , and for any closed formulas B and 
all the free variables of A occur among p 0 , . . . , p m ). Also, given each B i or C i is a closed formula, it does not matter what order we substitute them into A. In particular, for any i,
Now using this information and Lemma 4.4 we see that
A[B 0 /p 0 , . . . , B n /p n , . . .] L = A[B 0 /p 0 , . . . , B m /p m ] L = A[B 1 /p 1 , . . . , B m /p m ][B 0 /p 0 ] L = A[B 1 /p 1 , . . . , B m /p m ][C 0 /p 0 ] L = A[C 0 /p 0 , B 1 /p 1 , . . . , B m /p m ] L . . . = A[C 0 /p 0 , C 1 /p 1 , . . . , B m /p m ] L . . . = A[C 0 /p 0 , . . . , C m /p m ] L = A[C 0 /p 0 , . . . , C n /p n , . . .] L . Given f ∈ P rop ω L , for any formula A, let A f = df A[f (0)/p 0 , . . . , f (n)/p n , . . .] = A[B f (0) /p 0 , . . . , B f (n) /p n , . . .].
It is clear that if
A is closed then A f is just A. Furthermore, A f will always be closed, as a free p i in A is replaced by some closed formula B f (i) (where B f (i) L = f (i)). So for any A and f we have A f L ∈ P rop L . The substitution operator f → A f commutes with the connectives:
Proof. Take B i = B f (i) in Corollary 4.5.
Now for each formula
The canonical L-model structure is
where
and the other items are already defined.
Now K L can be shown to be a B t∀p -model structure. The authors of [11, §4.6] show that
This implies that K L satisfies the condition CProp.
For CTee, observe that ϕ
L satisfies the definition for ϕ n and therefore ϕ n ∈ P ropF un L .
That P ropF un L satisfies CImp, CConj and CNeg follows from the results
For the first of these,
and the others are similar. Our main burden is to show that that CAll holds on the canonical model. The following two lemmas are analogous to Lemmas 9.3 and 9.4 of [8] .
Lemma 4.7. For any closed formula ∀p n A, and any prime L-theory a, we have that a ∈ ∀p n A L iff there is some X ∈ P rop L such that a ∈ X and
Conversely, suppose there is some X ∈ P rop L such that a ∈ X and
is an L-independent pair. So by Lemma 4.1 there is some prime L-theory Γ, extending
and as such it must be that
Therefore it must be that L B X → A[c/p n ], so by the rule RIC(con) of Lemma 2.2, L B X → ∀p n A. So finally, as a is a L-theory and B X ∈ a, closure of L-theories under L-implication gives ∀p n A ∈ a, i.e. a ∈ ∀p n A L .
Proof. We begin with a definition. If f ∈ P rop ω L and n ∈ ω, then
is the (possibly open) formula which applies the substitution f to all variables except p n , which remains unchanged. This satisfies:
Equation (4.2) holds because, as was mentioned in the proof of Corollary 4.5, when substituting closed formulas it does not matter in what order they are substituted for their respective variables (as long as we only try substituting once for each variable, which we
For equation (4.3) we note that ∀p n (A f \n ) = (∀p n A) f \n (for, as f \n leaves p n unchanged, it makes no difference if it is forced to leave it unchanged, as in (∀p n A) f \n ). And clearly
∈ P ropF un L , and so CAll holds.
That completes the proof that K L is a B t∀p -model structure. To show that M L is a B t∀p -model, it remains only to show that it satisfies CMod. But if c ∈ Con, then by definition, ϕ c L ∈ P ropF un L , where, as c is closed,
Hence ϕ c L satisfies the definition for ϕ c , and therefore ϕ c ∈ P ropF un L as required for CMod.
Lemma 4.9 (Truth Lemma). For any formula A, ϕ
Proof. By induction on the complexity of A. For the proof we write M L just as M. 
by induction hypothesis, which equals ϕ B→C L by the first equation of (4.1). The cases of A = B ∧ C and A = ¬B are similar.
Finally, for the case A = ∀p n B:
by induction hypothesis, which equals ϕ ∀pnB L as in the proof of Lemma 4.8 above.
Proof. Let L A, and choose n such that the free variables of A are among p 0 , . . . , p n . By the rule UG, L ∀p 0 · · · ∀p n A. Hence using axiom A10, for any closed formulas B 0 , . . . , B n we get L A[B 0 /p 0 , . . . , B n /p n ]. In particular, for any f ∈ P rop ω , we have L A f . As a regular L-theory contains all L-theorems, this implies that for all a ∈ 0 L , A f ∈ a, hence M L , a, f |= A by the Truth Lemma. Thus A is valid in M L as required. 
Completeness for Inductively Defined Logics
An inductively defined logic is one specified by adding to the axiomatisation of B t∀p some set Σ of axioms from the long list of optional axioms given at the end of Section 2. Now we give, for each axiom from that list, a corresponding condition on model structures. We use the following definitions: R 2 abcd iff there is some x ∈ K such that (Rabx and Rxcd) R 2 a(bc)d iff there is some x ∈ K such that (Rbcx and Raxd) R 3 ab(cd)e iff there is some x ∈ K such that (R 2 abxe and Rcdx). 
* ≤ x (CC5) for any x ∈ 0, Raxc implies a ≤ c (CD1) (Rabc and Rade) implies there is some x such that (b ≤ x and c * ≤ x and Raxb * ) (CD2) for any
CD8) Rabc implies there is some x such that (Rac * x and for any d, e (Rx
The conditions other that (CE1)-(CE3) are those given in [11, pp. 300-301, 352] for dealing with the non-quantified axioms.
Fix any inductively defined logic L = L Σ . An L-model structure is a B t∀p -model structure that satisfies all of the above conditions corresponding to the members of Σ. An L-model is a B t∀p -model on an L-model structure. We will show that L is characterised by validity in L-model structures.
Proof. It has to be shown that K L is an L-model structure. We prove here the cases for the conditions CE1-CE3, and refer the reader to Chapters 4 and 5 of [11] for the cases of the conditions corresponding to other possible axioms of L. Take any ϕ, ψ ∈ P ropF un L , so by definition ϕ = ϕ A L and ψ = ϕ B L for some formulas A and B. We make repeated use of the equations of (4.1) and Lemma 4.8, along with (4.3) and the definition of ϕ
ω and, to avoid confusion of value-assignments, write A for the closed formula A f . Then for any P ∈ P rop,
But by (4.2) and the fact that A is closed and hence unchanged by substitution,
by Lemma 4.7. But by axiom E2, as p n is not free in A ,
Corollary 5.3 (Completeness). For any inductively defined logic
Proof. By Lemma 5.2 and Theorem 4.11.
Incompleteness
A model structure or model is called full if its set P rop of admissible propositions contains every one of its hereditary subsets. In that case, if S ⊆ P rop then S is admissible, being hereditary, and so S = S. It follows that in any full model,
and so universal quantifiers have the standard semantics
Routley and Meyer speculated in [10, p. 235] that the system RP is incomplete for its full model-structures, i.e. that there are formulas valid in all full RP-model structures that are not RP-theorems. This was confirmed by Kremer in [7] by proving that the set of all formulas valid in all full RP-model structures is not recursively axiomatisable, and indeed is recursively isomorphic to full second-order logic. This shows that the use we have made of models with a restricted set of admissible propositions is essential for providing a complete relational semantics for RP. But what of other logics, such as EP? In this final section we show that there are numerous inductively defined logics that are incomplete for their full model-structures. To state our results most generally, let L Alg be the smallest logic that contains all of the axiom schemes A1-A9, B1-B5, B8-B10, B14, B18, C1-C4 and D1-D5.
We will define a particular formula Inc such that (1) Inc is valid in all full model structures whatsoever; and (2) Inc is not a theorem of L Alg .
It follows that every sublogic L of L Alg is incomplete for its full model-structures, since Inc is valid in all full L-models by (1), but is not a theorem of L by (2) . In particular, it can be shown that EP is a sublogic of L Alg , as is EM t∀p , the extension of EP by t and the mingle axiom (A → B) → ((A → B) → (A → B)), so the incompleteness applies to these logics, and to all of their sublogics. Now to define Inc, let Exm (for Excluded Middle) be the sentence ∀p(p ∨ ¬p), and let Atm (for Atom) be the sentence
as usual for Boolean algebraic semantics. A formula A is valid in M if |A| M f = 1 B for every f ∈ B ω . It can be shown that every theorem of L Alg is valid in every Boolean algebraic model. All of the axioms A1-A10, B1-B5, B8-B10, B14, B18, C1-C4 and D1-D5 are valid, and all the rules R1-R7, RIC, and E1-E3 preserves that validity. Showing this involves a great deal of fairly routine algebraic reasoning which is left to the interested reader. Proof of validity of the quantifier axioms makes use of analogues of Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6, namely:
• If f and g agree on the free variables of A, then |A| M f = |A| M g.
• If p n is free for B in A,
These algebraic models do not validate such schemes as B6, B7 and C5, so our incompleteness method does not apply to RQ. But that logic was dealt with by Kremer's result. We now show that there are Boolean algebraic models invalidating Inc. Recall that an atom of a Boolean algebra is a non-zero element a such that if b ≤ a, then b = a or b = 0. Equivalently, a non-zero a is an atom iff a ≤ b or a ≤ −b for all b. Note that as Atm is a sentence with no constants, it has a fixed value in any model that is independent of V , and so can be denoted |Atm| B . Since there do exist complete atomless Boolean algebras -for instance the algebra of regular open subsets of the real line -it follows that there are algebraic models that validate L Alg but do not validate Inc. So Inc is not an L Alg -theorem, which gives our overall incompleteness result.
